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United States v. Yonn: Expanding the Government's
Capability to Eavesdrop
INTRODUCTION
The subtlety and accuracy of electronic surveillance devices
arm government agents with effective weapons with which to
confront crime.1 The potency of these devices, however, may
threaten the privacy of personal conversations. Recognizing this
1. Eavesdropping is not a development of the electronic age. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 168: "Eavesdroppers, or such as listen under walls or windows, or the
eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and
mischievous tales, are a common nuisance, and presentable at court-lect .. "
Along with electronic developments, however, have come more sophisticated eaves-
dropping methods. Under present technology, devices can amplify conversations in a
room by merely using the vibrations of the voices on the windowpane. Tubular and
parabolic microphones can intercept conversations occurring hundreds of yards away.
Not only are these devices powerful, they are increasingly subtle as well. For example,
transmitters designed as olives transmit sound via their toothpick aerials. See generally
Note, Eavesdropping and the Constitution, A Reappraisal of the Fourth Amendment
Framework, 50 MINN. L. REV. 378 (1965).
The potency of these devices has not been overlooked by the government. "[E]lectronic
surveillances provide the Government with one of the most effective weapons
in its legal armory." Hearing of the National Commission for the Review of Federal and
State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance (1974) (statement of Wil-
liam V. Cleveland, Ass't Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sept. 17, 1974). See also S.
DASH, R. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959), wherein the authors
note that "[o]rganizations of police and district attorneys have constantly presented their
case to the governor or legislature, claiming without hesitation that wiretapping has been,
their most effective weapon against organized crime." Id. at 38.
The practice of electronic eavesdropping by the government has prompted much criti-
cism. See Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance By Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in
Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (1969). Professor Spritzer argues that all electronic
surveillance should be abolished because of the danger it poses to privacy: "The time has
come when, if we give reign to the advancing science of electronics, there will be no
hiding down here." Id. at 186. See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 764-65 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[M]ust everyone live in fear that every word he speaks may be
transmitted or recorded and later reported to the entire world? I can imagine nothing that
has a more chilling effect in people speaking their minds and expressing their views on
important matters."); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1966) ("Few threats to liberty
exist which are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices."); JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, REPORT ON OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND STATE STREETS ACT OF 1968, S. REP.
No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 92, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &. AD. NEWS 2112,
2154 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1097] ("As a result of electronic developments, pri-
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threat, both the Supreme Court and Congress have developed
guidelines controlling the use of electronic surveillance devices
by government authorities. 2
The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States3 determined that
those conversations that a person justifiably expects to remain
private deserve fourth amendment protection from warrantless
governmental scrutiny.4 In Hoffa v. United States,5 however,
the Court held that a person may not justifiably expect a confi-
dant to maintain the secrecy of what he has been told. Rather, a
person's protection lies in choosing his confidants carefully, not
in the fourth amendment. Moreover, the informant may carry a
transmitter or a tape recorder to obtain such evidence.6 Congress
codified this holding in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
vacy of communication is seriously jeopardized by these techniques of surveillance.").
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 deals with federal
eavesdropping. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982).
2. For a discussion of these guidelines, see infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
3. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See infra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
4. The fourth amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
rant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
It is the requirement of obtaining a warrant which protects the individual from
unreasonable searches. Police must first discover facts which indicate that some act of a
criminal nature has occurred in order to justify their intrusion. The police then present
these facts to an independent magistrate who decides whether they suffice to justify a
prudent man's belief that a warrant should issue. The magistrate thereby makes a prob-
able cause determination. By interposing an independent magistrate between the police
and the individual, the fourth amendment protects the individual's rights. It is presumed
that a police officer "involved in the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" would
render a distorted evaluation of the facts. A detached magistrate's decision is more objec-
tive. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). See also Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1972) (State's Attorney involved in investigation is not an
independent magistrate.); MacDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) (warrant-
less entry to search house held unconstitutional).
Critics have referred to the Supreme Court's treatment of the fourth amendment as
"confusing." See Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The
Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. LJ. 323, 329 (1973) (describing the Court's fourth amendment
cases as a "mess"); Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603 (1982) (The author calls for a reexamination and reordering of the
conceptual framework of fourth amendment jurisprudence.).
5. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). See infra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
6. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). In White, the Court extended the Hoffa
rationale to informants who carry recording or transmitting devices on their persons.
United States v. Yonn
and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 7
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held in
United States v. Yonn 8 that government authorities without a
warrant may place a device in a person's hotel room to monitor
and record his conversations with an informant.9 In its analy-
sis, the court first derived from Katz the proposition that consti-
tutional protection attaches only to those conversations which a
person justifiably expects to remain private. 10 The court then
relied upon Hoffa to reason that because the defendant confided
in the informant, he could not justifiably expect that his conver-
sations would remain private." Absent this justifiable expecta-
tion, the Yonn court held that fourth amendment protection did
not attach to conversations which occurred in the hotel room.
Thus, the court sanctioned the government's use as evidence the
tapes derived from the warrantless electronic surveillance.
After first reviewing both judicial and statutory federal elec-
tronic surveillance law, this note will analyze the Yonn court's
denial of the defendant's expectation of privacy, and will discuss
Yonn's detrimental impact upon individual liberties. This note
will conclude that the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Yonn that
the defendant had no justifiable expectation of privacy was
erroneous, and that the government therefore violated the de-
fendant's fourth amendment rights by eavesdropping on his
conversation without a warrant.
BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court Decisions: Electronic Surveil-
lance and the Government's Use of Informants
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of whether the
fourth amendment protects individuals from electronic surveil-
lance in Olmstead v. United States.12 In Olmstead, the Court
held that although the fourth amendment shields tangible objects
7. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, Title III, §
802, 82 Stat. 212 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982)). See infra notes 37-47 and
accompanying text.
8. 702 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1983).
9. Id. at 1347.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 277 U.S. 438 (1927), (Olmstead was overruled in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).). Defendant Olmstead was the leader of a conspiracy that imported and dis-
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such as "homes" and "papers" from unwarranted governmental
intrusions, it does not protect intangibles such as conversa-
tions.13 Moreover, because only physical objects are protected,
only a physical trespass upon those objects can constitute a
search under the fourth amendment.14
The two-pronged test developed by the Court in Olmstead sur-
vived until Silverman v. United States.15 In Silverman, police
tributed liquor in violation of the Volstead Act. Without obtaining a search warrant,
federal agents tapped the telephone lines leading out of the building in which the conspi-
racy was headquartered. After listening to and recording conversations for four months,
officials had compiled enough evidence to convict Olmstead. The Supreme Court affirmed
the court of appeals' affirmation of the trial court's denial of Olmstead's motion to
supress transcripts of the recorded conversations. This opinion is now known primarily
for Justice Brandeis's eloquent dissent calling for a constitutional right to privacy. Id. at
471.
A penumbral right to privacy has been derived from the Bill of Rights. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965). In Griswold, the Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction for violating a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contra-
ceptives, ruling that the law impermissably violated the privacy of the bedroom. Yet, the
Court has rejected the notion that the fourth amendment creates a right to privacy per se.
The protection of the fourth ammendment applies only to unreasonable searches and
seizures. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 349, 350.(1967). See also Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REV. 193 (1890).
13. 277 U.S. at 465.
14. Id. Moreover, the Court noted that Congress could protect the secrecy of telephone
conversations by legislation. Id. Congress responded by enacting § 605 of the Communi-
cations Act, which provides that "no person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept ... or divulge ... the contents ... of such communications." 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1976 & Supp. V). Section 605 was first addressed by the Supreme Court in Nardone v.
United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), in which the Court held the statute to prohibit the
introduction into federal courts of evidence obtained directly by wiretapping. The Court
construed the phrase "no person" to include federal law enforcement officials, and found
that "divulgence" occurs within the meaning of the statute when wiretap evidence is
introduced at trial. Id. at 381-82. The development of more sophisticated electronic devices
rendered § 605 obsolete, since officials could eavesdrop without wiretapping. Title III was
designed to be more comprehensive in its coverage of surveillance techniques.
15. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). In Silverman, police suspected the defendant of running a
gambling operation. They secured the row house adjacent to the suspected premises for
use as an observation post. The police then inserted a spike attached to a microphone
through the wall between the houses until it touched a heating duct which acted as a
sounding board; this enabled the police to listen to conversations throughout the house.
Testimony derived from the monitored conversations was sufficient to convict the
gamblers. Id. at 506. The Supreme Court ruled that the contact between the spike and the
heating duct constituted a trespass. The Court concluded that the search was unlawful
and excluded the testimony derived from this search. Id. at 511.
The principal eavesdropping cases decided during the interim between Olmstead and
Silverman found the Court adhering to the Olmstead rule. See Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128, 132-33 (1954) (Police entered defendant's house by means of a key procured from
a locksmith, and drilled holes into the defendant's roof in order to facilitate their elec-
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physically intruded upon a suspect's home without a warrant in
order to effect an electronic surveillance. 16 Because of the tres-
pass, the Court excluded the evidence derived from the surveil-
lance. 17 In so doing, the Court implicitly recognized that conver-
sations, although intangible, merit fourth amendment protection.18
Nevertheless, the Court did not abandon the physical intru-
sion test until Katz v. United States.'9 In Katz, the issue was
whether federal agents needed a warrant to monitor private tele-
phone calls made from a public phone booth. Instead of applying
trespass law, the Court altered fourth amendment jurisprudence
by holding that the amendment protects a person's justifiable
expectation of privacy from unreasonable searches. Furthermore,
such justifiable expectations transcend physical boundaries. 20
tronic surveillance; although the Supreme Court found that this conduct "flagrantly,
deliberately and persistently violated... the Fourth Amendment," it did not suppress the
evidence because the investigation occurred in a state action, and the exclusionary rule
had not yet been applied to the states.); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751-53
(1952) (No trespass occurred when an informant wearing a transmitter was invited onto
the defendant's premises and authorities listened to incriminating conversations.);
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (No trespass occurred when police
placed a detectaphone on the outside of a wall to listen to conversations inside the room.).
For a thorough history of federal eavesdropping law, see S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 1, at
2154-55. See also J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELEC'RONIC SURVEILLANCE 1-21 (1977 & Supp.
1981); Spritzer, supra note 1.
16. The Court described the device and process as follows:
The instrument in question was a microphone with a spike about a foot long at-
tached to it, together with an amplifier, a power pack, and earphones. The officers
inserted the spike under the baseboard in a second floor room of the vacant house
and into a crevice extending several inches into the party wall, until the spike hit
something solid "that acted as a very good sounding board." The record clearly
indicates that the spike made contact with a heating duct serving the house occu-
pied by the petitioners, thus converting their entire heating system into a conductor
of sound.
365 U.S. at 506-07.
17. Id. at 512.
18. Once the Court concluded that the actions constituted a trespass, it decided to
exclude the evidence. It glossed over the second Olmstead requirement that the object
seized be tangible. The abandonment of the tangible object requirement was expressly
recognized in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), in which the Court stated
that "it follows from our holding in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) that
the Fourth Amendment may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well
as against the more traditional seizure of papers and effects." Id. at 485.
19. 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). Federal agents placed a listening device on the outside
of a public phone booth from which a suspect allegedly phoned in bets to his bookie. The
defendant claimed that the agents trespassed by encroaching on the phone booth. The
government claimed that it could not have trespassed because the phone booth was not a
private place.
20. Id. at 350-51.
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Katz has often been summarized as holding that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." 21 This aphorism does
not preclude the use of property notions in fourth amendment
law. It does, however, negate the proposition that trespass law
controls the legitimacy of a given search. The determination of
what is actually protected when one has assumed an expectation
of privacy "requires reference to a place. '22
To determine whether a person has a justifiable expectation of
privacy, the Court in Katz developed a two-pronged test.23 The
first prong requires a defendant to display a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy. The second prong requires a judicial determina-
tion that "that expectation is one which society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable." 24 Applying this test in Katz, the Court
determined that the defendant maintained a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. First, the defendant displayed his subjective
intention to keep his conversation private by closing the doors of
the phone booth. Second, the Court determined that society rec-
ognizes as reasonable a person's expectation that even a public
21. Id. at 351. See also United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 1983).
22. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143 n.12 (1978) ("[B]y focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned the use of property concepts
in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by that
Amendment."). See also Note, The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy-Katz v. United
States, A Postscriptum, 9 IND. L. REV. 468,492 (1976) ("The property or spatial considera-
tions upon which the Olmstead standard was based cannot be entirely disregarded under
the new standard .. . because they influence the determination of the objective reason-
ableness of the expectation....").
23. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan developed the test in his
concurrence. It has, however, been adopted in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41
(1979); United States v. Berrong, 712 F.2d 1370, 1374 (11th Cir. 1983) (warrantless search
of marijuana field held constitutional); United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1147 (5th
Cir. 1983) (placement of beeper within aircraft without a warrant held unconstitutional).
24. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143 n. 12 (1978) (no expectation of privacy in automobile glove compartment: "[A] 'legiti-
mate' expectation of privacy by definition means more than a subjective expectation of
not being discovered. A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season
may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which
the law recognizes as 'legitimate'."); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 943 (6th Cir.
1980) (placement of electronic tracking device in a drum of legal chemicals used to manu-
facture illegal substance, PCP, violated defendant's legitimate expection of privacy); Unit-
ed States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1978) (placement of electronic tracking
device in contraband did not violate defendant's rights because one cannot have a legit-
imate expectation of privacy in an illegal substance), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979);
United States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978) (same). See also Decker &
Handler, Electronic Surveillance: Standards, Restrictions and Remedies, 12 CAL W.L
REV. 60 (1975); Note, supra note 22.
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phone booth, while momentarily occupied, should afford the
occupant privacy. The defendant's actions merited fourth amend-
ment protection by fulfulling the two-pronged requirement.
Whether a particular place is considered public or private
depends on the speaker's subjective expectations and society's
objective recognitions. Society will not recognize as objectively
reasonable a person's subjective expectations that his conversa-
tions on a crowded street corner will necessarily remain private.
A crowded street corner, after all, is a public place. But society
will recognize as reasonable a person's subjective expectation
that his conversation in a phone booth will remain private.25
A person taking suitable precautions may justifiably expect
his conversations to remain protected from the government's
"uninvited ear. '26 The Supreme Court decided in Hoffa v. United
States,27 however, that a speaker enjoys no such fourth amend-
ment protection from people whom he invites to listen. A confi-
dant may reveal the contents of a converstion to the police with-
out violating the defendant's constitutionally protected
expectation of privacy. Likewise, police may, without first procur-
ing a warrant, plant an informant who will disclose to them his
conversations. The fourth amendment "does not protect a
wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he volun-
tarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."28 Instead, the
wrongdoer's protection lies in his careful selection of confidants. 29
The application of the Katz test to the Hoffa fact situation
demonstrates that the defendant in Hoffa did not have such an
expectation of privacy.30 First, he did not demonstrate an expec-
tation that the contents of his conversations would remain con-
cealed from the informant because he himself conversed with the
informant. Second, because a risk of disclosure is inherent in
every conversation, the Court determined that society would not
recognize as objectively reasonable the defendant's expectation
that his confidant would respect the privilege of that
25. 389 U.S. at 352.
26. Id.
27. 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (appeal taken from defendant Hoffa's conviction for at-
tempting to bribe a juror in an anti-trust trial).
28. Id. at 302.
29. "Although an informer intrudes upon privacy, an individual may guard against
such intrusion by choosing his confidants with care." Spritzer, supra note 1, at 174 n.24.
30. See 389 U.S. at 363 n.1 (White, J., concurring). Hoffa was decided before Katz.
Justice White emphasized, however, that Katz left Hoffa undisturbed.
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communication. 31
The Supreme Court has extended the Hoffa rule to include
informants carrying electronic transmitters and recorders. In
United States v. White,32 an informant carrying a transmitter
without a search warrant participated in conversations with the
defendant. Although the informant in White did not testify, as
did the informant in Hoffa,33 the Supreme Court determined
that the distinction between the informant testifying in one case
and providing evidence in another was insignificant.34 The de-
fendant had already assumed the risk that his confidant might
reveal their discussions to the police; whether the informant did
so simultaneously by transmitter, or shortly thereafter by tape
recording, made little difference.35
The White Court implicitly required that the informant carry
the electronic equipment on his person, rather than place it
31. 385 U.S. at 303 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 429 (1962) (Brennan,
J., dissenting)): 'The risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an
informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent
in the condition of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever
we speak." Lopez was convicted of attempting to bribe an IRS agent. He appealed on the
basis that evidence was derived from a surreptitious recording made by the agent. The
Court reasoned that because the agent was duty bound to disclose the conversation, there
was no valid objection to the use of evidence which reproduced the conversation more
reliably than the agent's memory. 373 U.S. at 439.
32. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Only three justices concurred with Justice White's plurality
opinion. Justice Black, however, cast the deciding vote because of his adherence to the
view that conversations are not protected by the fourth amendment. Id. at 754. Four other
justices, including Justice Douglas, disagreed with the plurality opinion. Three justices
filed strong dissenting opinions; their objections were based primarily upon the power of
electronic surveillance. "What the ancients knew as 'eavesdropping,' we now call
'electronic-surveillance,' but to equate the two is to treat man's first gunpowder on the
same level as the nuclear bomb." Id. at 756 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The issue of elec-
tronic surveillance has provoked heated debate.
33. Id. at 749, 751.
34. Id. at 752. Justice Douglas dissented on the grounds that the distinctions between
an informant not carrying electronic surveillance equipment and one carrying such
equipment was significant. Justice Douglas quoted Justice Brennan's dissent in Lopez:
"Electronic aids add a wholly new dimension to eavesdropping. They make it more pene-
trating, more indiscriminate, more truly obnoxious to a free society. Electronic surveil-
lance, in fact, makes the police omniscient, and police omniscience is one of the most
effective tools of tyranny." Id. at 759-60 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963)).
35. Furthermore, the Court stated that it should not be "too ready to erect con-
stitutional barriers to relevant and probative evidence which is also accurate and reli-
able." Id. at 753.
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somewhere else.36 The Court's rationale was that by conversing
with an informant, a suspect jeopardizes his privacy by risking
that the informant, and not a third party, will reveal, record, or
transmit the conversation. Because it is in the informant that
the suspect confides, and because it is the informant who reveals,
transmits, or records the conversation, the defendant's rights are
not abridged.
Title III: Congressional Regulation of Electronic
Surveillance
The Court's holdings in Silverman, Katz, Hoffa, and White
defined those situations in which a warrant is necessary; the
Supreme Court in Berger v. New York 37 described the type of
warrant required. This decision, in turn, spurred congressional
interest in regulating federal electronic surveillance. 38
In Berger, the Court examined the provisions of New York's
wiretapping statute delineating the prerequisites for undertaking
electronic surveillance. The defendant in Berger, who was con-
victed with evidence obtained by electronic surveillance, argued
that the statutory warrant requirements were too vague. The
Supreme Court agreed with this argument and reversed the
lower court's decision.39
36. The informant can either "simultaneously record conversations with electronic
equipment which he is carrying on his person" or by "carrying radio equipment which
simultaneously transmits the conversations either to recording equipment located else-
where or to other agents monitoring the transmitting frequency." Id. at 751. See Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). The Court, in referring to a recording device carried
into a room by an IRS agent, noted this distinction: "It was carried in and out by an
agent who was there with petitioner's assent, and it neither saw nor heard more than the
agent himself." Id. at 439. See also United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (same).
37. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). In Berger, an attorney interested in illicitly obtaining a liquor
license approached state officials. Pursuant to the state wiretapping statute, the officials
procured a warrant to install a recording device in the attorney's office. The defendant
attorney objected to the admission of tape recordings of his office conversations because
the warrant authorizing the eavesdrop was too vague. The Supreme Court agreed with
the attorney, and overturned the New York Court of Appeals' determination that the
statute was constitutional. Id. at 55-60.
38. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982). See supra note 1.
39. Generally, the Court emphasized that the state statute merely says that a warrant
may issue on reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of a crime may be obtained by
eavesdropping. 388 U.S. at 54. This requirement was held too broad. For a definitive
review of the status of fourth amendment law at the time of the Berger decision, see
LeFave, Search and Seizure, "The Course of True Law... Has Not... Run Smooth,"
1966 U. ILL LF. 255. For a sprightly analysis of one state's statute, see Michael, Elec-
tronic Surveillance in Illinois, 1 LoY. U. CHI. LJ. 33 (1970).
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The Court found three principal deficiencies in the state stat-
ute, all of which Congress responded to when it enacted Title
111.40 First, because the statute did not require officials to set
forth particular facts supporting probable cause, Congress re-
quired the petitioning officer to provide a description of the loca-
tion and nature of the place in which the communications would
be surveilled.41 Title III also specifies that the petitioning officer
particularly describe the type of communication sought.42
The second Berger criticism addressed the warrant's sixty day
validity. The Court reasoned that such a lengthy period did not
sufficiently specify the period during which police had probable
cause to believe that a crime was being committed.43 Congress
remedied this problem by reducing the period to thirty days, and
by adding an automatic termination provision. Government offi-
cials must now terminate electronic surveillance upon the ac-
complishment of the investigation's objective if this occurs before
the thirty day period has lapsed.44
Third, Title III requires authorities to notify suspects that they
have been electronically surveilled. Although the Court in Berger
40. See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 1, at 2113. "This proposed legislation Title III
conforms to the constitutional standards set out in Berger v. New York .... " Id.
Although never expressly decided by the Supreme Court, Title III's constitutionality
seems well established. See United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971) (upholding
Title III as being in accordance with Berger), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)b(ii) (1982).
42. Id. § 2518(1)b(iii). The text of the statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a
wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation
to a judge of competent jurisdiction .... Each application shall include the
following information
(b) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by
the applicant to justify his belief that an order should be issued, including (i)
details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be
committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location of the
facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be inter-
cepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of communication sought to
be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing the
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted.
Id.
43. 388 U.S. at 59.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5)(1982). Furthermore, this section provides that "[elvery order
and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall
be ... conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not
otherwise subject to interception under this chapter .. " Id. The purpose of this provi-
sion is to reduce to a minimum the interception of conversations which are irrelevant to
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realized that any warning prior to surveillance would alert the
suspects and thereby thwart the purpose of the operation, it
nevertheless required some sort of notice.45 Congress responded
with an after the fact notice provision. Authorities must inform
subjects of surveillances regarding which conversations have
been monitored and recorded.46 Authorities obtaining a warrant
in conformity with the above requirements may constitutionally
eavesdrop. 47
the crime under investigation. See generally United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132,
1139-40 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905 (1977).
45. 388 U.S. at 60. Accord Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,355 n.16 (1967).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1982).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be
received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative
committee, or, other authority of the United States, a State, or a political sub-
division thereof if the disclosure of that information would be violation of this
chapter.
Id. This rule is to be interpreted along the lines of the judicially created exclusionary rule.
See generally Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (discussing Title III's legis-
lative history).
The modern exclusionary rule has created great controversy among courts and com-
mentators. "Of all the two-faced problems in the law," observed Justice Traynor, "there is
none more tormenting" than this. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States,
1962 DUKE .J. 319, 319. See also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK
FORCE IN VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 55 (1981); Wilson, The Origin and Development
of the Federal Rule of Exclusion, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1073 (1982).
In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1913), the Court held that intangible evidence
secured by an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment is
inadmissible in federal court. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), extended
that rule to also exclude intangible evidence, such as conversations. Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), applied the exclusionary rule to the states.
The judiciary created the exclusionary rule to promote judicial integrity and to deter
unlawful police conduct. Judicial integrity is theoretically promoted by the judiciary's
refraining from the use of evidence obtained in violation of the constitution. See Ber-
nardi, The Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to Preserve a Liberal
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 51, 56 (1981). See also
Olmstead v. United States, 272 U.S. 438, 469-70 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Alpart
from the Constitution, the Government ought not to use evidence obtained and only
obtainable by a criminal act [wiretapping].. ..").
It is thought that unlawful police conduct is deterred by -removing the-incentive to
disregard the constitution. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Accord Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486(1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
Attempts have been made to measure empirically whether the deterrent purpose of the
rule has any claim to validity. See Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?
Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY: L.J. 681 (1974)
(concluding that the data supported the deterrence theory); Oaks, Studying the Exclu-
sonary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 655 (1970) (concluding that the
data neither supports nor detracts from the deterrence theory); Spiotto, Search and Seiz-
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The Majority Opinion
In United States v. Yonn,48 the Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the fourth amend-
ment protects an individual when authorities acting without a
warrant place an electronic surveillance device in a suspect's
hotel room to monitor and record his conversations with an
informant. In Yonn, the defendant offered to pay a government
informant named Dozier to fly a planeload of marijuana from
Columbia to Florida.49 The Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") provided Dozier with a portable tape recorder to record
some of his conversations with the defendant, Yonn.50 Yonn
later asked Dozier to rent a motel room for him where they could
discuss plans for Dozier's flight.51 Dozier complied with Yonn's
ure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEG. STUD.
243 (1973) (concluding that the data does not support the deterrence theory and suggest-
ing that the rule be abolished).
The Court in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), said of these studies: "The
final conclusion is clear. No empirical researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has
yet been able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a deterrent effect even
in the situations in which it is now applied." Id. at 452 n.22.
Title III also incorporates a consent provision, whereby: "It shall not be unlawful under
this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communica-
tion, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)
(1982).
This provision covers two factual situations. One is that presented in White, where the
agent/informant carries the electronic equipment, see, e.g., United States v. Davanzo, 699
F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Howell, 664 F.2d 101 (11th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1978). Another situation involves informants
recording telephone conversations, see, e.g., United States v. Salisbury, 662 F.2d 738 (11th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Tousant, 619 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. King,
587 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hodge, 539 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1976).
Title III's consent provision is inapplicable to the Yonn facts, as evidenced by its
absence from the decision. It was, however, commented upon in United States v. Padilla,
520 F.2d 526, 527 (1st Cir. 1975), a case factually similar to Yonn. The Padilla court
interpreted this provision as doing no more than codifying pre-existing consent case law,
and accordingly excluded the tapes. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
48 702 F2W 1341 (11th Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 1343.
50. Id. at 1344. Some conversations were recorded using this method, as in White. The
conversations objected to at trial were intercepted by a device which was not carried by
the informant.
51. Id. at 1344-46.
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request, and informed the DEA of the planned meeting. 52 With-
out obtaining a warrant, DEA agents placed a transmitter in
Yonn's hotel room and set up their monitoring and recording
devices in another room.5 3 The DEA allegedly recorded conver-
sations only when Dozier was in Yonn's motel room.54 Nonethe-
less, the agents recorded enough incriminating conversation to
convict Yonn of conspiracy to import marijuana and intent to
distribute it.55
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
trial court's denial of Yonn's motion to supress the tape of his
conversations with the informant. The Eleventh Circuit reached
this conclusion by utilizing a two-step analysis. It first applied
Katz, determining that Yonn had no expectation of privacy in
his hotel room. Second, the court cited Hoffa as the basis for its
conclusion that Yonn had maintained no justifiable expectation
of privacy in his discussions with Dozier.
The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the Katz aphorism, "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," 56 to mean that
no area physically demarcated can be constitutionally protected
because of those boundaries.5 7 Therefore, the court concluded,
the location of the conversations was irrelevant to the question
of whether the conversations were protected. Instead, the court
decided that the determinative factor was Yonn's own expecta-
tion of privacy.
The Eleventh Circuit further relied upon the Hoffa decision to
determine that Yonn had lost his expectation of privacy when he
52. Id. at 1346.
53. Id. at 1347. The decision does not reveal why the DEA failed to secure a warrant.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1344. Yonn violated 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, 952, 963 (1982). In Title III, Con-
gress specifically enumerated several crimes for which electronic surveillance could be
authorized, including crimes "dealing in narcotic drugs, marijuana or other dangerous
drugs." 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1982). See also S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 1, at 2157 ("The
major purpose of Title III is to combat organized crime.").
56. 702 F.2d at 1347 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)).
57. "The location of the conversations that were intercepted is not determinative; the
proper inquiry is whether the government's activity in electronically listening to and
recording the conversations violated privacy upon which the [defendant] justifiably
relied." Id. at 1347 (quoting United States v. Shields, 675 F.2d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 1982)).
The Yonn court relied upon United States v. Shields. Shields, however, involved an
informant who carried the recording device on his person, as in United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745 (1971). The informant in Yonn, however, did not carry the device. See supra
notes 32-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of White.
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confided in Dozier. 5 8When Yonn confided in Dozier, he relin-
quished his expectation of privacy, leaving their conversation
unprotected. 59 Because the DEA may monitor and record unpro-
tected conversations without obtaining a warrant, the tapes were
admissible.
To support its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit noted that Dozier
had consented to the recording of the conversation in the hotel
room. The court reasoned that consent by one of the parties to
the conversation's interception waived constitutional protection
for that conversation. 60
The Dissent
The dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
Katz, observing that "Yonn [had] maintained an expectation of
privacy, not that his conversations with Dozier would remain
confidential, but that his hotel room would remain unbugged." 61
Thus, in the dissent's view, the location of the conversations was
relevant to the determination of whether they were constitution-
ally protected. The dissent agreed with the majority's premise
that Dozier could have disclosed the contents of the conversa-
tions to the government.62 Dozier, however, did not disclose the
conversation. Instead, the government obtained the evidence by
planting electronic devices in Yonn's room without a warrant.
This was the fourth amendment violation.
The dissent further argued that Dozier's consent to the record-
ings did not determine the legality of the eavesdropping as the
majority had maintained. Although Dozier rented the room, he
rented it in Yonn's name; Dozier therefore exercised no control
over the room. Dozier had no authority to consent to the placing
of the device in Yonn's room. His consent could not waive
Yonn's rights.6 3
58. 702 F.2d at 1347.
59. Id.
60. Id. Consent may serve to waive constitutional rights. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973). See also Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (search of
defendant's hotel room held unconstitutional where consent was given by hotel clerk
rather than defendant).
61. 702 F.2d at 1350. (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
62. Furthermore, the dissent emphasized that Dozier could have worn a body micro-
phone, as had the informant in White. "Although the practicalities are the same, the
legal principles are different." Id.
63. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel clerk does not have the author-
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To support its argument, the dissent relied upon United States
v. Padilla,64 a case factually similar to Yonn. As in Yonn, the
informant in Padilla neither testified nor carried an electronic
device. Like Yonn, authorities placed the electronic device in the
suspect's room without a warrant. The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, however, suppressed the tapes. 65
The Padilla court reasoned that according to Katz the defend-
ant maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel
room. Thus, no electronic device could be planted without a war-
rant. If, however, the informant had testified, transmitted, or
recorded the conversations himself, as did the informants in
Hoffa and White, the evidence would have been lawfully ob-
tained.66 Since the DEA, and not the informant, planted the
transmitter and recorded the conversation, the Padilla court rea-
soned that neither the Hoffa nor the White rationale was appli-
cable. 67 The conversations, therefore, deserved constitutional
protection.
ANALYSIS
The Defendant's Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Eleventh Circuit reached its conclusion that Yonn's con-
versation with Dozier was not protected by applying the hold-
ity to waive guest's constitutional rights).
The dissent compared the situation in which Dozier could supposedly consent to the
waiver of Yonn's rights "to a secretary making hotel reservations for her employer's
business trip, then giving the government her consent to bug the room." 702 F.2d at 1350.
64. 520 F.2d 526 (1st Cir. 1975). The Eleventh Circuit relied upon Padilla just one year
before it decided Yonn. In United States v. Shields, 675 F.2d 1152 (11th Cir. 1982), the
Eleventh Circuit distinguished Padilla because in Shields the informant carried the elec-
tronic device, while in Padilla, the device was placed in the hotel room by independent
agents. Thus Padilla and Yonn are both distinguishable from Shields. Yet the Eleventh
Circuit cited Shields as support for its Yonn decision.
Yonn and Padilla appear to be the only two cases in which the informant did not carry
the device, but, rather, the device was placed in the room by independent sources. In
Padilla, the three judges voted unanimously to exclude the tapes. In Yonn, two judges
decided to admit the evidence, with one judge dissenting. Thus, of the six judges who
have heard such a case as presented by Yonn, four have at some point held it unconstitu-
tional to admit such evidence.
65. 520 F.2d at 528.
66. Id. at 527. "The government would have us overlook the fact that a microphone
was installed in the hotel room without prior authority and consider the case as if the
agent carried the recording device on him, thus bringing it within the authority of United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)." Id.
67. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
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ings of Katz and Hoffa. It first applied Katz to determine that
Yonn had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel
room.68 The court interpreted Katz as rendering irrelevant the
place of the conversation to the question of its constitutional pro-
tection. The court reasoned that the determinative factor is the
defendant's subjective expectation of privacy.
The Yonn court then applied the Hoffa rationale to determine
that the defendant did not demonstrate an expectation of pri-
vacy.69 The Supreme Court in Hoffa found that constitutional
protection does not attach "to a wrongdoer's misplaced belief
that a person to whom [he] voluntarily confides his wrongdoing
will not reveal it."70 The Yonn court reasoned from this decision
that "the fourth amendment did not protect Yonn from the risk
that Dozier might not maintain his confidence." 71 According to
the Eleventh Circuit, Yonn's assumption of risk indicated that
he did not maintain a subjective expectation of privacy.
The court's analysis overlooks the fact that Dozier did not
reveal the contents of the conversation. Dozier never testified, as
did the agent in Hoffa, nor did he carry the recorder or transmit-
ter on his person, as did the informant in White. Rather, the
transmitter was placed in the room by the DEA independent of
Dozier, and the tapes were made by the DEA. Dozier's absence
or presence did not affect the location of the transmitter. It
remained in the room whether or not Dozier was present.
The Hoffa and White decisions require the defendant to assume
only the risk that his confidant will testify about, transmit, or
record conversations. 72 He need not assume the risk that some-
one else will reveal the communication, nor that someone else
will surreptitiously plant an electronic device to transmit or
record them. Neither the Hoffa nor the White decisions justifia-
bly serve as the basis for the Yonn decision. By misapplying
these cases the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly determined that
Yonn did not maintain a subjective expectation of privacy.
The Yonn court should have employed the two-pronged test
developed in Katz. In Katz, the location protected was a phone
booth. Likewise, "a man's home is, for most purposes, a place
68. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
70. 385 U.S. at 302.
71. 702 F.2d at 1347.
72. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
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where he expects privacy.... ' 73 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit
completely disregarded the location of Yonn's conversations.
The issue overlooked by the Yonn court was whether Yonn
maintained a reasonable expectation that his hotel room would
remain private, not from informants, but from secret electronic
devices. If Yonn did expect the room to remain private, and
society is willing to recognize that expectation as being reason-
able, then Yonn did have a justifiable expectation of privacy and
his conversations within that room deserved constitutional protec-
tion.
The application of the Katz test to the Yonn fact situation
demonstrates that Yonn did have a justifiable expectation of
privacy in his hotel room. First, Yonn demonstrated that he
intended to keep his conversations with Dozier private by not
conversing with him in public. Rather than speaking with Doz-
ier in the hotel hallways or lobby, Yonn spoke in his own room.
It can be reasonably inferred from this course of conduct that
Yonn thought he could be afforded privacy in his hotel room.
Second, society must be willing to recognize that Yonn's expec-
tation that his hotel room would remain private is objectively
reasonable. The Supreme Court has recognized that a hotel room
deserves virtually the same constitutional protection as a home,
because a hotel room is no less than a temporary home.7 4 A per-
son's privacy in his own home is respected because an individual
must have a final retreat from governmental intrusions. Because
Yonn satisfied both prongs of the Katz test, his expectation of
privacy in his hotel room was reasonable. The Constitution
protects a reasonable expectation of privacy from unwarranted
governmental intrusions.
Thus, it was through a misinterpretation of Katz and a misap-
plication of Hoffa that the Eleventh Circuit determined that
Yonn did not maintain an expectation of privacy. A proper
interpretation of Katz demonstrates that Yonn did maintain a
reasonable expectation that his hotel room would remain private
and that his conversations would be constitutionally protected.
When the DEA placed the device in Yonn's room, it violated his
73. 389 U.S. at 361. Accord United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297,
314-15 (1972); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1960).
74. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). Accord United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48 (1951); Lusting v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
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fourth amendment rights. This violation should have compelled
the court to suppress the tapes.
The Informant's "Consent"
As a corollary, the Eleventh Circuit elevated Dozier's consent
to the tape recordings to the status of a de facto waiver of Yonn's
fourth amendment rights. In order to have consented to the
recordings, Dozier first had to consent to the DEA's placement of
the monitoring device in Yonn's room. The right to privacy in
the hotel room, however, belonged to Yonn, since it was his
room. It was a right which only Yonn could waive.75 There is no
evidence that Yonn granted Dozier authority over the room by
giving him the key or other means of control. Furthermore, con-
sidering the nature of Yonn's alleged activities, it is doubtful that
he would have waived this protection. Dozier's consent was
therefore invalid and the ensuing eavesdropping unconstitutional.
The dissent in Yonn suggested alternative electronic surveil-
lance techniques which the DEA could have lawfully utilized
pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in White, which held
that an informant could transmit or record conversations in
which he participates. Indeed, the DEA conducted part of its
investigation by concealing an electronic device on the infor-
mant's person, just as authorities had done in White.
Aside from the White technique, the DEA could have instructed
the informant to carry an electronic device into the hotel room,
plant it, converse with the suspect, and then remove the device
upon leaving. The adoption of this method would protect the
informant from discovery if physically searched by a wary sus-
pect. This method is consistent with the White rationale. Because
the suspect has chosen to speak with the informant, the suspect
has relinquished his expectation of privacy in him. By relin-
quishing his privacy expectation the suspect has assumed the
risk that the informant might transmit or record their conversa-
tions. Because the informant brings the device in and out of the
room when he enters and leaves, however, no one else may use
the device to intercept the suspect's conversations. 76 Thus, the
suspect is only exposed to that risk which he has assumed.
75. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964). See supra note 63 and accompany-
ing text.
76. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 15334
United States v. Yonn
According to Katz, the suspect's expectation of privacy in his
room is objectively reasonable. This expectation is frustrated
only when the device remains in place, thereby violating the
suspect's fourth amendment rights.
IMPACT
The rule to be distilled from Yonn is that authorities may plant
electronic surveillance devices in hotel rooms without warrants,
and introduce into evidence resulting tapes of conversations in
which an informant participates. The consequences of this rule
include the possibility that electronic devices may be installed
for lengthy periods of time without warrants, so long as the con-
versations introduced into evidence involved informants. This
situation is contrary to the intentions manifested by the Supreme
Court in Berger v. New York. There, the Court indicated that
specific warrant requirements limiting the use of electronic eaves-
dropping devices would be necessary to prevent fourth amend-
ment violations. Congress responded to the Court's decision in
Berger by enacting Title III. The provisions of this act further
delineate the requirements called for in Berger, thereby provid-
ing safeguards for fourth amendment rights.
The spirit of the Yonn decision violates the intent of Title III
in several respects. Because "[b]y its very nature eavesdropping
involves an intrusion on privacy that is broad in scope,"77 Con-
gress requires authorities to procure a warrant based upon partic-
ularities.7 8 The method of electronic surveillance sanctioned by
the Yonn court allows for general rather than particular use of
electronic devices, contrary to congressional intent.
Furthermore, limitations imposed by Congress on the use of
electronic surveillance devices may be breached when govern-
ment authorities forego independent judicial supervision. Offi-
cials could extend surveillances and fail to notify subjects that
they had been electronically surveilled. 79 Without this notice,
subjects would not know whether their conversations had been
monitored and possibly stored in official files, despite clear con-
gressional intent that this information be disclosed.
77. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967).
78. See supra notes 4142 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the First Circuit in
United States v. Padilla, 520 F.2d 526 (1st Cir. 1975), warned:
Electronic devices could be installed for lengthy periods of time without antecedent
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Such scenarios clearly conflict with both Congress's and the
Supreme Court's goal of curtailing the abuse of electronic surveil-
lance. By allowing government agents to use an informant to
legitimize their planting of an unauthorized device in a hotel
room, the Yonn court has opened the door to more extensive and
less discriminate use of these powerful devices.
CONCLUSION
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have expressed concern
that the indiscriminate use of electronic surveillance may violate
citizens' rights. Accordingly, both bodies have demonstrated
their intent to limit the use of these devices. The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has nonetheless significantly
expanded the opportunities for their lawful, and imprudent, use.
The Yonn court's decision to allow the placement of a device
without a warrant erodes fourth amendment protection.
MICHAEL W. CUSICK
authority, so long as only a suspect's conversations with police agents were offered
in evidence and the enforcement officials alleged that nothing else was recorded.
Under this approach a room-or an entire hotel-could be bugged permanently with
impunity and with the hope that some usable conversations with agents would
occur.
Id. at 528.
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